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Abstract 25  26 Intention attribution guides the cognitively most demanding forms of social 27 learning, such as imitation, thereby scaffolding cumulative cultural evolution, but 28 is not thought to be necessary for more basic forms of social learning. Here we 29 present evidence that in marmoset monkeys even most basic forms of social 30 learning such as enhancement depend on intention attribution. Marmosets 31 perceived the behavior of a conspecific and a conspecific-like robot, but not that 32 of a moving black box, as goal-directed. Their subsequent choice behavior was 33 shaped by social facilitation and stimulus enhancement, that is very simple forms 34 of social learning, but only when exposed to the conspecific and robot, which 35 they previously had perceived as intentional agents. We discuss the implications 36 of this finding for contemporary debates about social learning, including 37 emulation learning and ghost control studies, the necessity of goal-directed 38 copying for cumulative cultural evolution and the limits of current classification 39 systems of social learning for the evolution social and asocial learning. 40  41 Key words: stimulus enhancement, goal-attribution, social learning processes, 42 common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) 43 44 
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Even simple forms of social learning rely on intention attribution in marmoset 45 monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) 46 Social learning is an important means for the acquisition of information 47 and skills, and underlies the cultural evolution seen in humans (Henrich & 48 McElreath, 2003; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). Since it encompasses all forms of 49 learning that are influenced by observation of, or interaction with, another 50 animal or its products (Heyes, 1994), it can take many different forms, as 51 acknowledged by  various classificatory systems (e.g. Byrne & Russon, 1998; Call 52 & Carpenter, 2002; Heyes, 1994; Want & Harris, 2002; Whiten & Ham, 1992; 53 Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004).  54 Categorizing forms of social learning potentially has various important 55 advantages. It allows pinning down the social and ecological conditions that most 56 strongly favor the evolution of (different forms of) social learning. It also enables 57 comparative judgments about the cognitive complexity of a particular species 58 showing a specific form of social learning. Most importantly perhaps, it can 59 crucially contribute to our understanding of the evolution of social and asocial 60 learning in different lineages, and have profound repercussions for theories 61 addressing potential co-evolutionary processes between the two. The cultural 62 intelligence hypothesis (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011), for example, assumes that 63 because social learning is arguably more efficient than asocial learning, selection 64 more readily favors social learning ability. If social learning ability involves 65 cognitive mechanisms that also favor asocial learning, increased asocial learning 66 ability and intelligence will ensue as a by-product.  67 
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The extent to which classifications of social learning actually provide 68 these benefits, depends on the cognitive homogeneity of the categories, that is 69 the degree to which a particular category reflects one uniform set of cognitive 70 processes. Available classification systems of social learning do not necessarily 71 satisfy this critical assumption, and may therefore be potentially misleading 72 when used for evolutionary analyses related to cognitive complexity. For 73 example, the two-action method tends to be used as an operational definition of 74 imitation, but different species may reach the criterion of behavioral matching 75 through different cognitive mechanisms (Byrne, 2005). 76 There are probably two main reasons for this cognitive heterogeneity of 77 existing classifications. First, instances of social learning tend to be categorized 78 based on outcomes rather than the (usually hidden) processes involved. Second, 79 a wide range of criteria are used for classifying various forms of social learning. 80 These include whether the behavior of a focal animal is influenced by another 81 animal in general ways or whether copying occurs, and if so, which aspects of a 82 behavior are copied (e.g. detailed actions vs global action sequences Byrne & 83 Russon, 1998), whether the copied behavior is novel or not (Huber, 1998), or 84 what sources of information are used (e.g. the goals, actions or results of 85 behavior; Call & Carpenter, 2002). Other classificatory criteria that are used 86 reflect primarily historic developments (e.g. the distinction between stimulus 87 and local enhancement, for a review, see Heyes 1994). At the very least, the 88 coexistence of multiple classificatory schemes and terminologies suggests the 89 absence of consensus on the actual cognitive mechanisms involved.  90 
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For observational and imitational forms of social learning, efforts are 91 underway to pin down the cognitive mechanism they are based on (Heyes, 92 2005), but this is not the case for the more simple forms of social learning, such 93 as social facilitation or enhancement learning. In social facilitation (Zajonc, 94 1965),  behavioral matching is thought to occur because the mere presence of a 95 conspecific  increases the general activity of a subject, which thus also increases 96 the probability that it will show the target behavior compared to baseline. In 97 enhancement learning, a conspecific interacting with a specific stimulus or being 98 in a specific location increases the probability that the subject will also pay 99 attention to the same stimulus or same location. Once its attention is focused on 100 the same stimulus or location, individual learning may ensue. Thus, attentional 101 processes and individual (e.g. stimulus-response) learning may well be sufficient 102 for these forms of social learning (for a detailed analysis, see Heyes, 1994). 103 The aim of this study was to establish whether in common marmosets, 104 social facilitation and enhancement effects do indeed follow the mechanistic 105 pathway suggested by these accounts, or whether additional cognitive processes 106 may play a role. In particular, we investigated whether intention attribution 107 modulates the propensity to engage in these simple forms of social learning.  108 Throughout this paper, with intention attribution, we refer to early 109 intention understandings of the sort shared by infants and nonhuman primates 110 (reviewed in Wellman & Brandone, 2009), rather than a mature, human-like 111 intention understanding based on a fully fledged Theory of Mind. In particular, 112 we refer to the understanding of goal-directedness of actions as revealed in 113 looking time studies modeled after the seminal study of Woodward 1998 (see 114 
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also Daum & Gredebäck, 2011, for a review of follow up studies with this 115 paradigm).  116 Based on the account of the simple forms of social learning outlined 117 above, intention attribution is not expected to play any role in social facilitation 118 and enhancement. Rather, it is thought to be required only for the cognitively 119 demanding forms of social learning, such as true imitation (Call & Carpenter, 120 2002; Tomasello, 1996, 1999; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993), where it 121 serves to regulate imitation at a meta-cognitive level through deliberate top-122 down processes (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Tomasello, 1996). However, just 123 because it is parsimonious to assume that social facilitation and enhancement 124 can result from a minimal set of cognitive mechanisms, this does not necessarily 125 mean that animals in the real world behave this way. Indeed, it seems more 126 efficient for animals only to attend to conspecifics that are engaged with their 127 environment in a goal-directed way, especially if these animals are gregarious 128 and thus nearly continuously exposed to conspecifics in proximity. 129 To assess intention attribution in the form of perceiving the goal-130 directedness of behavior, we adopted and extended the habituation-131 dishabituation looking paradigm originally developed by Woodward (1998) for 132 human infants. Looking paradigms have been successfully used with nonhuman 133 primates in both nonsocial (e.g. Cacchione & Krist, 2004; Santos, Seelig, & 134 Hauser, 2006) and social contexts (e.g. Hauser, 1998; Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & 135 Gallese, 2008; Uller, 2004); see also Carey (2009) for a review). 136 The present goal attribution task consisted of a habituation and a test 137 phase (Figure 1). During the habituation phase, subjects observed an agent 138 
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repeatedly approaching and briefly interacting with the same of two equidistant 139 objects (that is the target object).  During the test phase, the position of the target 140 objects had been switched. The agent now either continued to approach the 141 target object as before and therefore had to take a new route, or, alternatively, 142 performed exactly the same behavior as before in terms of its topography, that is 143 walked along the same trajectory, which now, however, led to another object (i.e. 144 the non-target object). Differential novelty reactions to the two test events 145 (measured in terms of looking times) allows us to identify with regard to which 146 dimension the subjects had encoded the habituation event. If during the 147 habituation phase, the subject perceived the event with regard to the agent’s 148 goal-directedness, it would show a weaker novelty reaction during the test event 149 where the agent continued to approach the same target object as before. 150 Alternatively, if the individual encoded the habituation event predominantly 151 with regard to the topography of the movement, the subject would react more 152 strongly to a novel path and look longer if the agent changed its trajectory, but 153 retained its original goal (Woodward, 1998). Longer looking times in the goal-154 violation event has thus been linked to a form of goal-attribution, which 155 represents an early step in the development of a mature intention 156 understanding. For an evaluation of alternative interpretations, see discussion. 157  Within the Woodward paradigm, we compared how the marmosets 158 perceived the behavior towards objects of three different potential agents: a 159 conspecific, a conspecific-like robot, and a black box. We hypothesized that the 160 marmosets would attribute goal-directedness to the conspecific and perhaps, to 161 a lesser extent, to the robot, but not to the black box.  162 
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To assess social facilitation and enhancement effects, the looking time 163 trials were immediately followed by free choice trials.  This allowed us to assess 164 which of these three agents would induce social facilitation and enhancement 165 effects, and whether this was contingent on previous goal attribution to these 166 agents.    167 If social facilitation and enhancement effects only occur in those cases 168 where the behavior of the agent had beforehand been perceived as goal-directed, 169 intention attribution must play a role in simple forms of social learning in 170 marmosets. The role of intention attribution is particularly strong if such an 171 effect goes beyond a simple preference to preferentially pay attention to these 172 agents. If, alternatively, intention attribution does not play a role and a more 173 mechanistic pathway is at work, we expect a uniform influence of all agents on 174 the subjects’ behavior during the free choice trials since the contingencies 175 between agents and objects were always identical. 176  177 
Methods 178 
Subjects  179 Thirty-three adult common marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) from 180 the Primate Station of the Anthropological Institute and Museum in Zurich 181 participated in the experiment. The animals were housed socially in pairs or 182 family groups ranging from 4-6 individuals in indoor cages (one or multiple units 183 of 4m3, according to group size); additional access to outdoor cages was available 184 during the warm season. The cages were equipped with various enrichment 185 devices and the animals were fed 3 times per day with fresh fruit, porridge and 186 
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insects; water was available ad libitum. For further details on housing conditions, 187 see Burkart & Heschl (2007).  188 We formed three experimental groups: for one, a conspecific acted as 189 agent, for the second a robot, and for the third a black box. An effect size analysis 190 of a pilot study (Burkart, 2004) suggested that 9-10 individuals are likely to be 191 sufficient to reveal an effect in this paradigm. In the conspecific condition, a 192 group member (breeding female) served as agent, and the remaining animals in 193 the two groups summed up to 9 subjects. In the robot group, we tested 10 194 subjects, and in the black box group, we first tested 10 subjects and decided to 195 add 4 additional ones in order to also be able to detect potentially weaker effects. 196 However, adding these four additional subjects did not alter the results. 197  In addition, 8 family groups (4-6 individuals per group) participated in 198 the object attractiveness tests conducted prior to the main experiment, which 199 served to establish that there was no a priori preference for one of the objects 200 used during the main experiment. These subjects did not participate in the main 201 experiment. 202 
Materials and Procedure 203 
Perception of goal-directedness. The stimuli (i.e. the agent approaching 204 and interacting with a target) were presented as video clips of 10 seconds rather 205 than as real-life events. This allowed us to standardize the timing of the stimuli 206 to make sure that it was identical in all trials and all conditions. Importantly, 207 previous findings had shown that common marmosets can use social information 208 presented as video clips for social learning (Burkart, Strasser, & Foglia, 2009). 209 
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The conspecific approached the target and quickly interacted with it 210 (touching and sniffing); the robot and the black box approached the target and 211 waggled in front of it. The black box was fixated over the robot and was thus 212 moved by it, to ascertain that the behavior of the robot and the black box were 213 identical with regard to approach trajectories and kinematics, as well as the 214 waggling movement. An additional black cloth along the bottom boarders made 215 sure that the legs of the robot were not visible.   216 The subjects were tested in an experimental cage consisting of three 217 compartments, one with the video screen, an observation compartment from 218 which the subjects could watch the video, and a waiting compartment where the 219 animal stayed between trials (Figure 2). Each trial started with the subject 220 waiting in the waiting compartment. As soon as the subject was relaxed and 221 showed no sign of distress, such as vocalizations or piloerection, the 222 experimenter opened the guillotine door to the observation compartment from 223 outside, and the video clip started. The behavior of the subject was videotaped 224 from outside, and after the trial was over (end of the 10-sec video clip), the door 225 opened again and the animal could go back to the waiting compartment until the 226 next trial started.  We presented the marmosets with three habituation trials and 227 two test trials, and recorded the duration the subjects attended to the stimulus 228 sequences afterwards from the videos.  The order of test trial type (old goal vs. 229 old path) and the object serving as target object for the agents were 230 counterbalanced between subjects, and the objects used were equally attractive 231 (see below) and equidistant to the agent in the video clips, and also to the 232 subjects during the free choice trials.  233 
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The day prior to testing, subjects were already presented with the 234 habituation clips until they had watched 30% of the habituation clip during at 235 least three trials, in order to make sure that they really had seen the event on the 236 habituation video. Only subjects that passed this pre-criterion in no more than 237 three days would proceed to the main test; five individuals did not proceed to the 238 main test.   The procedure of these pre-trials was the same as during the main 239 test. The videos from this pre-habituation phase were analyzed in the evening of 240 the same day. The day after a subject reached this criterion, the experiment 241 started.  242 
Social learning. Immediately after the last test trial, we ran free choice 243 trials to investigate whether the subjects would copy the object choice of the 244 agent. The video screen showed a still white frame, and while the subject was 245 waiting in the preparatory compartment, the two real objects were placed in the 246 observation compartment in front of the screen. Next, the door to the 247 observation compartment opened again and the subject could enter it and 248 interact with the objects, but it also had the option to simply leave the test area.  249 If the monkeys entered the test compartment, we recorded which object they 250 interacted with, and for how long. 251 
 Pretest: Object Attractiveness. In order to guarantee that subjects had no 252 intrinsic preference for one of the two objects used as targets in the experiment, 253 we conducted object attractiveness tests prior to the main experiment. We used 254 8 objects of similar size and material, but of different colour and shape. These 255 objects were first presented in a randomized order to 8 groups of common 256 marmosets that did not participate in the main experiment. We recorded the 257 
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latency until each object was first approached as well as the interaction duration 258 and calculated the mean value for each object across groups. Based on this value, 259 we composed 2 pairs of similarly attractive objects. These pairs did not differ 260 significantly with regard to approach latencies and interaction durations (Pair 1: 261 t6 = -0.90, P=0.856 for the interaction time and t7= -1.095, P=0.31 for the latency; 262 pair 2: t6=0.505, P=0.631 for the interaction time and t7=0.115, P=0.912 for the 263 latency).  Finally, the objects were presented in pairs to the 8 groups. For pair 1, 264 half of the groups first approached one object, the other half the other object. For 265 pair 2, 5 groups first approached one object, and three the other one. We used 266 pair 1 for all the experiments, and randomized which of the two objects served 267 as target object across the subjects. 268 
 269 
Data Coding and Reliabilities 270 All tests were video-recorded and analyzed with INTERACT software V8.0. from 271 MANGOLD GmbH. An individual was coded as watching the screen if (i) its head 272 was oriented towards the screen and (ii) it was not focusing on an entity other 273 than the screen. Because common marmosets have conspicuous white tufts 274 around their ears, coding their head orientation is straightforward. Focusing was 275 defined as head- and eye orientation towards a given entity, often followed by 276 approach behavior and exploration. The most common entities the animals 277 focused on included the location where a front paw would be placed for the next 278 step or small pieces of the test compartment such as screws or bolts it went to 279 explore. Thus, whether such entities were focused on or not could most often be 280 verified by subsequent behavior. All trials, including habituation trials, were 281 
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analyzed by two independent raters (rater 1 and rater 2), who were blind with 282 regard to the experimental condition. An additional rater (rater 3) coded all test 283 trials, also blind with regard to the experimental condition. The second, but not 284 the third rater was trained by rater 1 to apply the above criteria in at least three 285 video clips from the habituation phase. Inter-rater agreements as well as the 286 correlation between the data are presented in table 1. All video clips are 287 available on request.  288 
Results 289 
Intention attribution 290 The monkeys in all three groups showed a significant habituation effect over the 291 three habituation trials (repeated-measures ANOVA: habituation trial (within): 292 F(2,60)=36.9, p<0.001, weakest post-hoc comparison: hab1 vs. hab2: t=2.194, 293 p=0.056; group(between) and (hab)x(group) interaction: ns.). In the test trials, 294 the individuals looked longer at the goal violation in the conspecific and in the 295 robot group but not in the black box group; in the black box group individuals 296 looked longer at the trajectory violation (Figure 3, right hand side, repeated 297 measures ANOVA: test (within): F(1,30)=6.325, p=0.017, group(between): ns, 298 (test)x(group): F(2,30)=8.924, p=0.001). Thus, the subjects perceived the 299 
behavior of the conspecific (effect size ηd2=0.694) and to a lesser extent of the 300 
robot (ηd2=0.399), but not the behavior of the black box, according to its 301 underlying intentional structure. We re-ran the analyses of the main effects 302 (repeated measures ANOVA; within: test [congruent vs. incongruent], between: 303 group [conspecific vs. robot vs. black box, see main text]) with the data from the 304 
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second and third rater. We obtained the same result as with the data from rater 1 305 (Table 2). 306  To rule out that differential outcomes in social learning (see below) 307 simply result from attentional biases, we compared whether the subjects paid 308 more attention to conspecifics and maybe the robot than the black box, during 309 the first habituation trials. In this neutral condition, they did not pay differential 310 attention to the conspecifc, the robot and the black box (ANOVA: F(2,30)=0.254, 311 p=0.777, first bars in Figure 3; differences in looking time range between 2.14 % 312 [conspecific vs robot] and 6.59% [conspecific vs black box]). Likewise, there is 313 no difference for the second (ANOVA: F(2,30)=0.068, p=0.934;  differences in 314 looking time range between 0.92 % [robot vs black box] and 3.12% [conspecific 315 vs robot]) and third habituation trials (ANOVA: F(2,30)=2.261, p=0.122; 316 differences in looking time range between 0.23 % [robot vs black box] and 9.9 % 317 [conspecific vs robot]). Thus, there was no a priori tendency in the subjects to 318 pay more attention to the conspecific or the robot compared to the black box that 319 could explain the social learning outcome. 320  321 
Social learning 322 The free choice trials after the habituation-dishabituation experiment 323 revealed the readiness of the marmosets to copy the agent’s goal. If the subjects 324 would be more ready to enter the middle compartment and interact with any of 325 the objects, and would do so for a longer amount of time, this would be 326 consistent with a social facilitation effect (Zajonc, 1965). If in addition, the 327 subjects would more readily approach the target object first (i.e. the agent’s goal) 328 
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and interact with the target object longer compared to the non-target object, this 329 would be consistent with a stimulus enhancement effect (Whiten & Ham, 1992). 330 In the conspecific group, all animals entered the middle compartment, 88 331 % did so in the robot group, and in the black box group 71 %. The total 332 interaction time with any of the objects was longest in the conspecific group, 333 intermediate in the robot group and shortest in the black box group (one-way 334 ANOVA: F(2,30)=9.77, p=0.001, for post-hoc significance levels see Figure 4a).  335 This indicates that social facilitation was most strongly induced by the 336 conspecific, to a lesser extent by the robot and even less in the black box 337 condition (effect size Cohen’s d: Conspecific vs Robot: d=0.97, Conspecific vs 338 Black Box: d=1.5, Robot vs Black Box: d=1.08). 339 From those individuals who entered the experimental compartment, 89% 340 approached the target object first (Binomial test: p=0.039) in the conspecific 341 group, 78% did so in the robot group (n.s.) and 50%, exactly the random 342 expectation, did so in the black box group. Animals in the conspecific and the 343 robot groups interacted significantly longer with the target object than with the 344 non-target object (repeated measures ANOVA: target(within): F(1,30)=24.4, 345 p<0.001, group(between): F(2,30)=9.591, p=0.001, (target)x(group) interaction: 346 F(2,30)=8.25, p=0.001, for post-hoc significance levels see Figure 4b). Thus, 347 
stimulus enhancement was induced by the conspecific (effect size ηd2=0.6) and 348 
the robot (ηd2=0.65), but not by the black box (ηd2=0.002).  349 The same pattern of correspondence between goal attribution and social 350 learning was present at the individual level across all conditions. With regard to 351 first approaches, 77 % of individuals who looked longer in the incongruent test 352 
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event first approached the target object, compared to 46 % of individuals who 353 looked longer at the congruent test event (χ2(1) = 3.3, p = .069). With regard to 354 exploration time, 94 % of individuals who looked longer in the incongruent test 355 event explored the target object for a longer amount of time, compared to 46 % 356 of individuals who looked longer at the congruent test event (χ2(1) = 8.66, p = 357 
.003), 358 
Discussion 359 Social facilitation and stimulus enhancement effects in marmosets were only 360 induced by agents whose behavior had been perceived as goal-directed. This was 361 the case when a conspecific or a robot, but not when a black box approached and 362 interacted with a target object. Indeed, the social facilitation and enhancement 363 effects were strongest after exposure to the conspecific, who was also perceived 364 most consistently as an intentional agent by the subjects. This suggests that 365 facilitation and enhancement effects are not purely mechanistically regulated by 366 associative mechanisms, because these mechanisms should have been triggered 367 by the black box as well which produced exactly the same contingencies and 368 behaviors as the other two agents. These mechanisms seem thus not sufficient to 369 explain the facilitation and enhancement effects in marmosets, but rather be 370 supplemented by intention attribution. 371 
Intention attribution or low-level explanation? 372  The marmosets in the conspecific and robot condition looked longer 373 when the agent’s behavior was inconsistent with regard to its previous goal than 374 when it was inconsistent with superficial features (the topography) of its 375 previous behavior (i.e., its path). Following the reasoning of Woodward and 376 
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colleagues (see also Carey, 2009 for a review), this indicates that they perceived 377 the previous behavior (the habituation event) in terms of its underlying 378 intentional structure, rather than in terms of its physical structure. Thus, the 379 marmosets represented the agent’s behavior as goal directed and could recruit 380 these representations to make more complex inferences, including predictions 381 about the agent’s future behavior. In humans, such an early understanding of 382 goal directedness later develops into a more mature understanding of 383 intentionality (Wellman & Brandone, 2009). 384  Some have questioned whether longer looking at inconsistent goal 385 behavior indicates sensitivity to goal directedness, or if more simple 386 explanations are possible (for a review, see Carey, 2009). First, subjects may 387 form an expectation merely based on the statistical regularities of the 388 habituation event (i.e. a hand grasps for a specific object), in the absence of any 389 perception of goal directedness.  Thus, Tomasello and colleagues (2005) have 390 argued that rather than perceiving the goal directedness of the agent, the 391 subjects expect people to reach for the same object again and again. Vaish and 392 Woodward (2005) argue that this is unlikely because infants do not show this 393 looking pattern in the case of inanimate agents, which excludes any explanation 394 referring to pure statistical regularities. Likewise, such an explanation can be 395 excluded for the marmosets, because even though the contingencies were the 396 same for all entities that served as potential agents, the monkeys did not react to 397 the goal-violation by the black box. 398 Identifying the cues necessary to trigger these looking patterns in the 399 marmosets requires additional experimentation. So far, we can exclude 400 
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biological motion, proposed by Rochat et al. (2005) because the robot moved 401 non-biologically in the same way as the black box, and eye-like stimuli because 402 the robot had no eye spots. Nevertheless, agent features do play a role, as 403 evidenced by the fact that the black box did not elicit goal attribution in the 404 marmosets. This may suggest that marmosets seem not to represent only the 405 action itself, but rather the agent-action combination, as goal-directed, contrary 406 to Gergely & Csibra’s proposal for the intentional stance of human infants 407 (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 408 1995). Furthermore, in humans, there is some indication that the range of stimuli 409 to which intention is attributed is broadened during ontogeny (e.g. while six 410 month-olds fail to react to the goal directedness of moving boxes (Kamewari, 411 Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005), 9 month-olds (Csibra, et al., 1999) and 412 adults attribute intentionality even to geometric figures: Heider & Simmel, 413 1944). However, the role of the specific task used has not been disentangled 414 sufficiently so far, and it may well be that rather than age alone, the format of the 415 task defines which agent stimuli are required for goal-attribution. Thus, even for 416 humans the key stimuli have not yet been identified.  417 A second alternative explanation to differential looking pattern in the 418 Woodward task is that it measures an expectation derived from everyday 419 experience. However, people do not normally reach for the same object 420 repeatedly (Vaish & Woodward 2005). The same is true for marmosets, and even 421 more so for the robot, which the subjects in the present study had never 422 observed to behave in a goal-directed way beforehand. Indeed, Vaish & 423 Woodward (2005) point out that their task was designed for novelty detection, 424 
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rather than as a violation-of-expectation test, and longer looking in one test 425 event over the other reflects which dimension of the event predominantly 426 influenced the perception of the habituation event (i.e. the superficial, physical, 427 vs the intentional structure of the behavior). 428 According to Carey (2009), a richer interpretation of looking time results 429 is supported if the knowledge representations revealed in looking time 430 paradigms can also be shown to have an inferential role for action production. 431 An infant study (Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2007) revealed that 7 month-432 olds copy the choice between two objects after having seen how an adult acted 433 upon one of these objects. However, they only did so for those actions that have 434 been shown to elicit differential looking patterns in other studies with the 435 Woodward Paradigm. In the present study, an inferential role of the attribution 436 of goal-directedness as expressed in looking times for direct action has also been 437 shown in the same subjects, thus favoring a rich interpretation of the looking 438 time results.  439 Finally, the knowledge apparent in looking time studies is often not 440 recruited for guiding action in infants (Matter Mandler, 2004). It may thus 441 constitute a transitional developmental stage that is necessary for the 442 development of action-guiding knowledge, but not functional in itself. Such an 443 explanation is intuitive for human infants who, at the time when they 444 demonstrate knowledge in perception, but not action based tasks, are still 445 completely depending on their mothers and performing correct actions is not yet 446 vital for them. In the present study, this explanation is unlikely (see also 447 Cacchione & Burkart, in rev.), (i) because we tested fully mature subjects for 448 
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whom knowledge which is never translated into action is unlikely to be of 449 adaptive value (Gomez, 2005) and (ii) because a broad body of evidence suggests 450 that nonhuman primates have a simple understanding of others’ behaviors as 451 intentional (Call, 2007; Rosati, Hare, & Santos, 2010). Indeed, macaques have 452 been shown to respond when a human experimenter reaches for a goal in an 453 “irrational” way (Rochat et al. 2008), just like 9 and 12 month-olds children do, 454 which represents even a further step in the development towards a mature 455 understanding of intention (Tomasello et al. 2005). A recent review by Wellman 456 and Brandone (2009) shows that early intention understandings shared by 457 children and nonhuman primates predict children’s later theory of mind. In sum, 458 the marmosets’ looking pattern in the present study most likely reflects a simple 459 intentional understanding in terms of the goal-directedness of an action, similar 460 to the one shown by 6 month-old children. 461 
Intention attribution and social learning 462 Our results suggest that the regulation of the so-called simple forms of 463 social learning (social facilitation and stimulus enhancement) is cognitively less 464 mechanistic than is theoretically possible and often assumed. In stimulus 465 enhancement, the attention of a subject is drawn to a specific stimulus by 466 another individual who interacts with that stimulus, and subsequent individual 467 (asocial) learning is more likely to result in convergent behavior compared to an 468 asocial situation. Since all agents approached the target object with identical 469 contingencies, the attention of the subjects should have been drawn equally to 470 the target object in all three conditions. This scenario would thus predict a 471 uniform influence of the agents’ behavior on the subject’s own choice. This was 472 
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not the case. Indeed, we suggest that the variation in the strength of social 473 learning was related to variable goal-attribution because we can exclude the 474 following two most plausible alternatives.  475 First, the stronger social learning effects in the conspecific condition than 476 in the robot condition and than in the black box condition could have arisen 477 because of an intrinsic preference to pay more attention to a conspecific or a 478 conspecific-like entity. Because this would automatically draw the attention 479 more to the target object as well, this could sufficiently explain the pattern of 480 observed facilitation and enhancement effects. However, we empirically 481 addressed this possibility by comparing how much attention the animals paid to 482 the different agents in a neutral condition but found no difference. Hence, the 483 animals were not simply more attracted to the conspecific or, to a lesser extent, 484 to the robot compared to the black box. The animals rather must have processed 485 the events differently: those with the robot or conspecifc as agent predominantly 486 with regard to goal-directedness, and that with the black box with regard to its 487 goal directedness. The results from the free choice trials suggest that only the 488 first way of processing leads to social learning. 489 Second, it could be argued that there is something about the interaction of 490 a conspecific with an object that serves as a releasing cue for stimulus 491 enhancement (e.g. the association of a grasping hand with an object) but has 492 nothing to do with the perception of goal-directedness. However, because the 493 robot and the black box moved with exactly the same kinematics and interacted 494 in exactly the same way with the object (waggling in front of it), this explanation 495 cannot account for the result that the subjects reacted to the goal violation by the 496 
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robot and learned socially from this. Thus, the most likely explanation for the 497 pattern of results is that the conspecific and the robot were perceived as 498 intentional agents and that this was crucial for the release of stimulus 499 enhancement in the subjects. Whether the reported social facilitation effect was 500 also driven by the perception of goal directedness cannot yet be decided at this 501 point since we cannot rule out that the mere presence, rather than the activity, of 502 a conspecific would have had the same effect.  503 We now turn to the question how the attribution of goal-directedness 504 could promote social learning. When ascribing a role to intentional 505 understanding in social learning, this influence tends to be construed as a 506 deliberate top-down process at a meta-cognitive level (e.g. Csibra & Gergely, 507 2007; Tomasello, 1996). However, a growing body of evidence reports that in 508 humans the attribution of mental states, including intentions, is not only 509 regulating behavior at a deliberate or even meta-cognitive level, but also 510 happens more automatically and may influence very basic social behaviors, such 511 as gaze following and even perception (Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). Since the 512 first possibility may require advanced cognitive functioning available only to 513 very few species, and since the habituation-dishabituation paradigm measures 514 implicit rather than explicit understanding of goal-directedness (see Carey, 2009 515 for an in-depth discussion into what kind of knowledge system looking time 516 studies tap), a non-deliberate influence is more likely.  517 Luo and Baillargeon (2005) found that in infants, differential looking 518 patterns only emerge if during the habituation trials both potential goal objects 519 were present during habituation. This may suggest that infants interpret the 520 
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behavior of the agent as reflecting its preference between the two objects, rather 521 than merely as a reflection of the agent’s goal to reach of a particular object (see 522 also Carry 2009). Our results suggest the same may be the case in the 523 marmosets, and we therefore predict that like in infants, differential looking 524 patterns should not emerge if only one target object was present during 525 habituation. 526 The perception of goal-directedness may serve as a cue at the first stage 527 of enhancement learning, when the attention of the subject is drawn to the 528 specific stimulus or location. However, it might also influence subsequent 529 individual exploration, since not only the first choice between the objects was 530 contingent on the previous perception of goal-directedness, but also the 531 interaction duration. In other words, the subjects also became more persistent in 532 exploring an object after perceiving an agent as having approached this object in 533 a goal-directed way, which is not expected if this second stage is pure individual 534 learning. Thus, the perception of goal directedness seems to signal where an 535 individual should increase explorative activity. This is likely to be very functional 536 because it limits the detailed exploration response to situations where 537 conspecifics are engaged in a meaningful activity rather than merely present or 538 moving about. 539  540 
  Implications for contemporary debates about social learning 541 The results of this study also have implications for other contemporary 542 debates about social learning. First, they may help to explain failures to 543 demonstrate emulation learning with ghost control studies. In emulation 544 
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learning, the subject learns about the affordances in the environment rather than 545 about the behaviors and their underlying intentions (Hopper, 2010). To 546 distinguish emulation from imitation, ghost control experiments are conducted, 547 in which the agent is removed to identify the effects on the observer of the 548 demonstration per se, particularly in highly cultural species such as chimpanzees 549 (Hopper, 2010). If a goal-directedness interpretation is crucial for a broad range 550 of social learning processes in primates, failures in ghost control studies need 551 not indicate the absence of imitation. Instead, they most likely imply that the 552 subjects in such studies react to the absence of goal-directedness, since by 553 removing the agent from the demonstration, not only the topography of the 554 action is removed, but also all agency cues, thereby strongly reducing the 555 salience of the demonstration.  556 Second, our findings may improve our insight into the role of intention 557 attribution for the origin of human cultures. Some nonhuman animals show 558 simple cultural systems in which individual innovations spread through the 559 population via social learning (Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). Nevertheless, human 560 cultures remain unique with regard to the accumulation of cultural elements 561 whose cognitive complexity far exceeds an individual’s inventive potential 562 (cumulative cultural evolution, Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). The most 563 prominent attempts to explain this idiosyncrasy attribute a key role to distinct 564 social learning processes (reviewed in Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Hill, 2010). 565 Specifically, they argue that humans, unlike apes, rely on truly imitational forms 566 of social learning which involve the reproduction of both the specific action and 567 the goal of the observed behavior, and thus require a concept of intentional agent 568 
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(Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello, et al., 1993). Our results show that the modulation 569 of social learning processes by intention attribution is neither unique to humans, 570 nor restricted to cognitively demanding forms of social learning, and thus 571 unlikely to be the key factor for cumulative cultural evolution since it is already 572 present in nonhuman primates. 573 Finally, our results may question the adequacy of existing classification 574 systems that are based on the outcome of social learning rather than on the 575 cognitive mechanisms involved. It is conceivable that intention attribution is not 576 involved in all cases of social facilitation or enhancement reported in the 577 literature. For example, red-footed tortoises have been reported to show 578 stimulus or local enhancement learning (Wilkinson, Kuenstner, Mueller, & 579 Huber, 2010). Having a solitary lifestyle, they are not expected to be sensitive to 580 the goal-directedness of others’ behaviors, which, in addition, would influence 581 their social learning. This suggests that forms of social learning that are 582 traditionally captured under the same label may be much more heterogeneous 583 with regard to the cognitive processes involved than is currently acknowledged. 584 Further studies that empirically map which cognitive mechanisms are involved 585 in which social learning phenomena would crucially contribute to validating the 586 classification systems currently used. 587 The availability of valid classification systems of social learning is 588 particularly relevant for evolutionary approaches to understanding the 589 emergence of social and asocial learning, and cognition in general (van Schaik & 590 Burkart, 2011). A future extension of the knowledge about the cognitive 591 mechanics of social learning might reveal that social learning processes as they 592 
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are traditionally classified based on outcomes (Heyes, 1994) do not directly map 593 onto classifications that would emerge if the same instance of social learning 594 were categorized according to the cognitive processes involved.  595 
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Figure 1: Goal-attribution task. During the habituation phase, the subjects are repeatedly 731 presented a videoclip showing an agent approaching one of two target objects, until they 732 habituate to it and lose interest. During the test phase, the position of the objects is reversed. 733 In one test event, the agent’s behaviour conforms to the superficial topography of his 734 previous behaviour, that is its trajectory (test goal violation); in the other test event, the 735 agent’s behaviour conforms to the intentional structure of its previous behaviour and 736 approaches the same object as before, but along a new trajectory (test no goal violation). If 737 the animals perceived the behaviour during the habituation phase according to its goal-738 directedness, they are predicted to look longer in the goal violation test event. 739   740 
741 
Habituation Test Goal Violation Test No Goal Violation 




Figure 2. The experiment was conducted in an enclosure consisting of three 743 compartments, one for the LCD screen, an experimental compartment, and a 744 preparatory or waiting compartment where the subjects were waiting between 745 trials. 746 747 




Figure 3. Left hand side: Agents used in the video clips for the three 749 experimental groups (a conspecific, a conspecific-like robot, and a black box). 750 Right hand side: Looking durations (s ± S.E.M.) in the goal-attribution tasks. In all 751 conditions, looking times continuously decrease during habituation trials and 752 recover during test trials. In the test trials, goal violation led to a stronger 753 reaction in the conspecific and the robot group. Thus, the conspecific (upper 754 row) and the robot (middle row) are perceived as intentional agents, but not the 755 black box. *(=p<0.05) and **(=p<0.01) indicate post-hoc significance levels for 756 the test events. 757 
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Figure 4. Social learning results. A: Social facilitation. Interaction duration with 767 both objects (s ± S.E.M.). Observing a conspecific approaching a target object 768 induced stronger social facilitation than observing a robot and observing a black 769 box did. B: Stimulus enhancement. Duration of interaction (s ± S.E.M.) with the 770 target (dark bars) vs. the non-target (light bars) object. Stimulus enhancement 771 was induced by the conspecific and the robot, but not by the black box. 772 **(=p<0.01) and ***(=p<0.001) indicate post-hoc significance levels. 773  774 
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Table 1: Inter-rater agreements and correlations based on looking duration per 779 trial. $: agreements between rater1 and 2 were also calculated at the frame level 780 (1frame=0.04sec). Values for rater 1 and 2 include the three habituation trials 781 and the test trials, whereas the additional rater 3 rated test trials only. 782 N=number of trials, ***: p<0.001. 783  784 
 Conspecific Robot Box Total 
% agreement          $  Rater1-Rater2 98.08% 95.38% 94.98% 96.01%      Rater1-Rater2 N=45, 98.60% N=50, 99.37% N=70, 99.15% N=165, 99.06%      Rater1-Rater3 N=18, 96.8% N=20, 95.34% N=28, 94.73% N=66, 95.48%      Rater2-Rater3 N=18, 96.8% N=20, 95.8% N=28, 94.9% N=66, 95.68% 
correlations          Rater1-Rater2 N=45, r2=0.992*** N=50, r2=0.988*** N=70, r2=0.998*** N=165, r2=0.996***      Rater1-Rater3 N=18, r2=0.962*** N=20, r2=0.974*** N=28, r2=0.970*** N=66, r2=0.97***      Rater2-Rater3 N=18, r2=0.964*** N=20, r2=0.974*** N=28, r2=0.970*** N=66, r2=0.97***  785 786 










Test x Group 
Sum of squares    
     Rater 1 16.1 19.3 54.4 
     Rater 2 15.94 18.8 52.6 
     Rater 3 9.26 13.22 37.9 
F-values    
     Rater 1 0.74 6.3 8.9 
     Rater 2 0.79 5.95 8.3 
     Rater 3 0.433 4.72 6.8 
p-values    
     Rater 1 0.487 0.017 0.001 
     Rater 2 0.496 0.021 0.001 
     Rater 3 0.652 0.038 0.004  792 
